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NOTES
Multiparty Disputes and Consolidated Arbitrations: An
Oxymoron or the Solution to a Continuing Dilemma?
I. INTRODUCTION
W hile arbitration in international commercial transactions has come of
age,' the resolution of multiparty disputes continues to present
problems for both domestic and international practitioners alike. In an
effort to make multiparty disputes more manageable, several jurisdictions
have considered the propriety of consolidated arbitration proceedings.2
This Note examines consolidated arbitrations compelled by court order
or legislative decree in the context of construction contracts and mari-
time charter party agreements.
The paradox of compulsory consolidation is manifest in the goals of
the arbitral process itself. On one hand, there is the duty to enforce pri-
vate agreements as they are written, while on the other hand, there is the
need for efficient proceedings and consistent awards. Although compul-
sory consolidation may result in more efficient proceedings, it frustrates
I R. Graving, The International Commercial Arbitration Institutions: How Good a Job Are
They Doing? 1 (Sept. 1, 1988) (unpublished manuscript, available in the Institute for Transactional
Arbitration, the author is the Director of the Institute for Transnational Arbitration); see also Ak-
sen, International Arbitration - Its Time Has Arrived, 14 CAsE W. REs. J. INT'L L. 247 (1982).
2 By consolidation is meant the act or process of uniting several pending arbitrations into
one hearing before the same panel of arbitrators. Although the parties may not necessarily
be the same, we do find the same or similar subject matter, common questions of law and
fact, and substantially similar issues and defenses.
G. Aksen, Multi-Party Arbitrations in the United States 2 (1980) (paper presented at the Interna-
tional Arbitration Symposium in Warsaw, available in the American Arbitration Association
Library).
3 A charter party is defined as
[a] contract by which a ship, or some principle part thereof, is let to a merchant for the
conveyance of goods on a determined voyage to one or more places. The term "charter
party," often shortened to "charter," designates the document in which are set forth the
arrangements and contractual agreements entered into when one person (the "charterer")
takes over the use of the whole of a ship belonging to another (the "owner").
BLAcK's LAW DICTIONARY 214 (5th ed. 1979).
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contractual relationships by requiring parties who are not in privity of
contract to arbitrate their disputes in a single forum. In this respect, this
Note considers whether compulsory consolidation is consistent with the
goals of the arbitral process.
Based on an analysis of compulsory consolidation in the United
States and abroad, and considering the potential barriers to the recogni-
tion and enforcement of the resulting awards, this Note concludes that
compulsory consolidation is inappropriate insofar as it undermines the
predictability in proceedings,4 interferes with binding contractual rela-
tionships, and jeopardizes the enforceability of arbitral awards in foreign
jurisdictions.
II. COMPULSORY CONSOLIDATION: THE BASIC ISSUES
Arbitration is a creature of contract.' Deeply rooted in the arbitral
process is the notion that:
An arbitration can validly take place only if the parties have specifi-
cally and expressly agreed to use this method for the settlement of
their disputes.... The voluntary nature of arbitration is based on the
principle that the agreement to arbitrate has not been compelled by a
third party.6
Where consolidation is imposed by court order or legislative decree, the
basic character of arbitration as a voluntary agreement is undermined.7
A significant factor in the prominence of international arbitration as
a mechanism of dispute resolution is the parties' right to self-governance
of disputes. In arbitration, the parties have the right to choose the proce-
dural rules and substantive law which will govern the proceedings in the
event of a dispute.' Thus, opponents of compulsory consolidation argue
that the imposition of such a procedural device violates the parties' sub-
stantive contractual rights and that, absent the express consent of all par-
ties, consolidation is an impermissible intrusion on the parties'
agreements.
Among the primary objectives in creating a contractually based sys-
tem for dispute resolution is the desire to limit the time, delay, and ex-
pense ordinarily associated with litigation.9 Contrary to these objectives,
4 See infra, note 88 and accompanying text.
5 See AT & T Technologies, Inc. v. Communications Workers of America, 475 U.S. 643
(1986); Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1 (1984); Butchers, Food Handlers and Allied Work-
ers Union of Greater New York and New Jersey, Local 174 v. Hebrew Nat'l Kosher Foods, Inc.,
818 F.2d 283 (2d Cir. 1987); Zolezzi v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 789 F.2d 1447 (9th Cir. 1986).
6 M. DoMKE, DOMKE ON COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION, § 1:01, at 1-2 (rev. ed. 1984).
7 See Dean Witter Reynolds Inc. v. Byrd, 470 U.S. 213, 217 (1985).
8 AMERICAN ARBITRATION ASSOCIATION, INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION IN
NEW YORK (1986) [hereinafter INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION].
9 By definition, arbitration is:
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however, critics argue that:
Consolidated proceedings are more time-consuming and more costly
than unconsolidated proceedings, since additional parties and arbitra-
tors are involved. Matters are enormously complicated by the incorpo-
ration of separate disputes in a single arbitration proceeding. Each
party assumes the additional burden of hearing claims, giving evidence
and discussing testimonies with all the other parties involved. There is
a higher probability [sic] of delays. Risks of omission and error are
multiplied. Additional time is needed for all arbitrators to acquire ac-
knowledge [sic] of the contentions and claims of all parties, and to
reach a decision on the merits of the dispute.10
In addition, the complexity inherent in compulsory consolidation,
may encourage parties seeking to avoid arbitration to use consolidation
as a dilatory tactic to coerce the settlement of disputes. This tactic takes
advantage of the fact that the party claiming damages may opt to "set-
tle-out" rather than face the time and expense of the long, drawn out
proceedings which would result from consolidation. Hence, compulsory
consolidation could be used by the party seeking to avoid separate pro-
ceedings as a sword rather than a shield.
Advocates of compulsory consolidation argue that a single proceed-
ing avoids duplicative arbitrations and inconsistent results. 1 The argu-
ment is made that consolidation is appropriate in multiparty disputes
because similar issues of fact will require access to the same witnesses
and documentary evidence if consistent results are to be achieved. 2
Although advocates of consolidation contend that the identity of the in-
dividual disputes remains separate and that consolidation does not au-
thorize the arbitrator to hear disputes between parties who are not in
privity,'3 they fail to recognize that the effect of consolidated proceedings
is to rewrite fundamental provisions of the arbitration clause. Since arbi-
tration clauses typically contain agreements on such subjects as choice of
law, choice of procedural rules, method of panel selection, and situs of
the proceeding the opportunity for frustration of one or more of the pro-
visions in the arbitration clause exists when arbitration proceedings are
consolidated.14
[a]n arrangement for taking and abiding by the judgment of selected persons in some dis-
puted matter, instead of carrying it to established tribunals of justice, and is intended to
avoid the formalities, the delay, the expense and vexation of ordinary litigation.
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 55 (5th ed. 1983)(emphasis added).
10 Hascher, Consolidation of Arbitration by American Courts" Fostering or Hampering Interna-
tional Commercial Arbitration? 1 J. INT'L ARB. 127, 136 (1984).
11 See Stipanowich, Arbitration and the Multiparty Dispute" The Search for Workable Solutions,
72 IOWA L. REv. 473 (1987).
12 See id. at 505.
13 See id. at 506.
14 For a survey on the relative importance of the various provisions contained in an arbitration
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III. CONSTRUCTION CONTRACTS AND MARITIME CHARTER PARTY
AGREEMENTS
The need for consolidation and the difficulties such a procedural de-
vice creates are clearly demonstrated in construction contracts and mari-
time charter party agreements. Both construction projects and maritime
charter party agreements typically involve three or more parties who
enter into independent contractual relationships with respect to the same
venture.1 5
In an international construction project, there are often webs of in-
dependent contractual relationships between parties of different national-
ities. 6 For example, a project owner will usually have separate
contractual relationships with the architect, the engineer, and the general
contractor. 7 Likewise, the general contractor will have independent
contractual relationships with both the project owner and the various
sub-contractors."' Because of the interdependent nature of these sepa-
rate contractual relationships, a dispute arising out of a construction con-
tract will have a ripple effect which will precipitate separate, but related,
actions. 9 Assuming binding arbitration clauses exist in all of the rele-
vant contracts, it is evident that there is a potential for inconsistent find-
ings and duplicative proceedings if the actions are separately arbitrated.
If they are consolidated, however, the parties' agreements are necessarily
rewritten.
For example, consider the project owner who seeks compensation
for the cost of additional work that needs to be done as a result of con-
struction defects.20 Because the arbitration clause is a creature of con-
tract, if the project owner is not in privity with the responsible party (i.e.,
a sub-contractor), he will have to seek compensation from the general
contractor under the arbitration clause contained in the primary con-
tract.21 In that type of case, the contractor will usually seek indemnifica-
tion from the subcontractor, who will in turn seek to place liability on
another party or back on the original parties. 2 In any event, the general
contractor faces the "man-in-the-middle" problem.23
clause see Coulson, A New Look at International Commercial Arbitration, 14 CASE W. RES. J. INT'L
L. 359 (1982). As discussed infra, notes 74-79, one of the main clauses frustrated by consolidation is
the selection of the arbitral panel in accordance with the terms of the arbitration clause.
15 INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION, supra note 8, at 1.
16 Devitt, Multiparty Controversies in International Construction Arbitrations, 17 INT'L LAW.
669 (1983).
17 INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION, supra note 8, at 1.
18 See Devitt, supra note 16, at 669-70.
19 See Stipanowich, supra note 11, at 478.
20 All hypothetical assume the existence of separate and binding arbitration agreements.
21 INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION, supra note 8, at 76.
22 See Devitt, supra note 16, at 670.
23 The "man-in-the-middle" is bound to two or more arbitration agreements. Thus, unless
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Like construction contracts, maritime charter party agreements in-
volve contractual relationships between several parties with respect to a
single vessel.2" For example, A, a shipowner, may make a charter party
with B, a time charterer, to lease a ship for a fixed period of time. B may
in turn make a charter party with C, the voyage charterer, to lease the
ship for a particular voyage. The result of this relationship is to make B
the middleman between A and C.25 Due to the unique nature of this
relationship, the charter party agreement between B and C will usually
contain provisions identical to those contained in the agreement between
A and B, thus imposing the same rights and obligations on each party.26
Hence, parallel contractual relationships are created and the potential for
multiparty disputes is heightened.
Suppose A seeks compensation for structural damage to the ship
which is allegedly caused by C. Because A cannot demand an arbitration
proceeding with C, since the two are not in privity of contract, A will
seek compensation for the damage to the ship under his charter party
agreement with B.27 B, in turn, will seek indemnification from C under
their respective charter party agreement. Like the contractor in the con-
struction hypothetical above, B faces the "man-in-the-middle" problem.
If the arbitration proceedings between the respective parties take place
separately, B will face duplicative proceedings and risk inconsistent re-
sults inasmuch as Bs liability to A will be determined on the issue of Cs
alleged damage to the ship. If C, the party who allegedly caused the
damage to the ship, is not present at both proceedings, different findings
of fact could result in inconsistent awards. It is in this and similar con-
texts that consolidation is considered in the resolution of multiparty mar-
itime disputes.
IV. CONSOLIDATION AND THE MAJOR ARBITRAL INSTITUTIONS
AND RULES
Currently, neither the American Arbitration Association
("AAA"),28 the International Chamber of Commerce ("ICC"),2 9 nor the
consolidation can be effected, the contractor will be forced to arbitrate the same issue of liability in
two or more separate proceedings and face the possibility of inconsistent results. See Devitt, supra
note 16, at 670. It is in an effort to ease this predicament that compulsory consolidation has arisen in
the context of construction contracts.
24 See Miller, Consolidated Arbitrations in New York Maritime Disputes, 14 INT'L BUS. LAW.
58 (1986) [hereinafter Miller, Maritime Disputes].
25 Id. at 59.
26 See id.
27 In this situation, the shipowner will demand arbitration with the time charterer because the
ship was returned in a damaged condition.
28 AMERICAN ARBITRATION ASSOCIATION, COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION RULES OF THE
AAA (1986).
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London Court of Arbitration ("LCA"),30 have enacted rules which
would allow an arbitrator to consolidate arbitrations in multiparty
disputes.
In accordance with its purpose of promoting arbitration as a volun-
tary process based on the agreement of all the parties, the AAA has re-
fused to order consolidation without the express consent of all of the
parties.31 However, the AAA will administer consolidated arbitrations
when they are ordered by the court. 32 As a result opponents of compul-
sory consolidation have criticized the AAA for being inconsistent and
have challenged the institution to amend its rules to include a prohibition
against compulsory consolidation.33
While the ICC has not adopted any general provisions providing for
consolidated arbitrations, in 1982 the institution published a guide to
multiparty arbitration which included proposed rules for the administra-
tion of multiparty disputes. 34 "Two basic assumptions accompanied the
drafting of the proposed rules: Multiparty arbitration must be freely
agreed upon by all parties concerned, and it must be provided for in ad-
vance by the contracts."3" While the guide has since been adopted, the
ICC Rules do not currently provide for consolidation without the con-
sent of all parties.3 6
One institution that has amended its rules to address the issue of
consolidation is the American Institute of Architects ("AIA"). The
AIA, which subscribes to the AAA Construction Industry Arbitration
Rules, amended its form documents in 1976 to bar consolidated arbitra-
tions without the express consent of the architect.3 7 Because construc-
tion contracts often incorporate the provisions of the AIA form
29 INTERNATIONAL CHAMBER OF COMMERCE, ICC RULES OF CONCILIATION AND ARBITRA-
TION (1988).
30 It should be noted that the rules of the International Arbitration Centre of the LCA do
provide for joinder of parties in certain circumstances. London Court of Arbitration International
Arbitration Centre, 7 Y.B. Com. Arb. (Int'l Council for Com. Arb.) 227 (1982).
31 However, the AAA Grain Arbitration Rules, and arbitrations administered by the AAA
under the 1974 New York Insurance Law § 671 (recodified as Insurance Law § 5102) does provide
for consolidated arbitrations under the appropriate circumstances.
32 See Litton Bionetics, Inc. v. Glen Constr. Co., 292 Md. 34, 437 A.2d. 208 (1981).
33 See Hascher, supra note 10, at 139. "Consolidation wrecks the whole arbitral procedure and
the AAA does absolutely nothing to include in its Arbitration Rules provisions through which con-
solidation, absent specific agreement of the parties, would be precluded." Id.
34 INTERNATIONAL CHAMBER OF COMMERCE, GUIDE ON MULTIPARTY ARBITRATION
UNDER THE RULES OF THE ICC COURT OF ARBITRATION (1982) [hereinafter ICC GUIDE].
35 Hascher, supra note 10, at 141.
36 ICC GJIDE, supra note 34.
37 Section 7.9.1 of AIA Document A201 provides in pertinent part:
No arbitration arising out of or relating to the Contract Documents shall include, by con-
solidation, joinder or in any other manner, the Architect, his employees or consultan*s
except by written consent containing a specific reference to the Owner-Contractor Agree-
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documents, the effect of the recent amendment is to specifically preclude
consolidation and thus, prevent the court from inferring an intent to
consolidate.38
In light of the current conflict regarding the propriety of compul-
sory consolidation, the major arbitral institutions should place priority
on drafting amendments to their arbitration rules stating whether pro-
ceedings will be consolidated in multiparty disputes. These amendments
would require parties to opt in or out of consolidation by a specific stipu-
lation in the contract. This would allow the parties to bargain over the
inclusion of a consolidation clause, thus giving full recognition to the
parties' freedom to contract while addressing the potential problem of
multiparty disputes.
V. CONSOLIDATED ARBITRATION IN THE UNITED STATES
In the United States, compulsory consolidation in both domestic
and international commercial disputes originated in New York.39
Although international commercial disputes fall explicitly under the ju-
risdiction of the federal courts at the present time," the development of
compulsory consolidation in New York remains significant in two re-
spects. First, federal courts which have ordered consolidation have
adopted the same underlying analysis as New York courts. Second,
where parties have stipulated in the arbitration clause that New York
law will govern the resolution of disputes, the question of whether the
parties intended the courts to have the power to order consolidation in
accordance with state law may arise. Thus, a meaningful discussion of
compulsory consolidation in the United States must be preceded by an
examination of New York law.
A. Consolidation Under New York Law
Until the Civil Practice Act was repealed in 1962, New York state
courts had express statutory authority to order consolidated arbitra-
tions.4 1 The courts' authority to order consolidation in the absence of
ment and signed by the Architect, the Owner, the Contractor and any other persons to be
joined.
THE AMERICAN INSTITUTE OF ARCHITECTS, AIA DOCUMENT A201, GENERAL CONDITIONS OF
THE CONTRACT FOR CONSTRUCTION § 7.9.1 (1976).
38 But see infra, note 118 and accompanying text. The state of Massachusetts, in response to
the AIA amendment, amended its arbitration statute to include a consolidation provision which
prevents parties from opting out by contractual agreement.
39 See Vigo Steamship Corp. v. Marship Corp. of Monrovia, 26 N.Y.2d 157, 257 N.E.2d 624,
309 N.Y.S.2d 165, cert. denied, 400 U.S. 819 (1970).
40 9 U.S.C. §§ 203-207 (1988).
41 State courts in New York initially found authority to order consolidation "on the theory
that under section 1459 of the then Civil Practice Act, an arbitration proceeding was a 'special
1990]
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the Civil Practice Act, however, is largely the result of judicial legislation
and exists only at common law. The adoption of compulsory consolida-
tion by the New York courts is illustrated in the landmark case of Vigo
Steamship Corp. v. Marship Corp. of Monrovia,42 in which the Court of
Appeals held that state courts could order consolidation of separate arbi-
tration proceedings under appropriate circumstances. The Vigo case in-
volved a charter party dispute where a shipowner alleged that structural
damage had been done to his let ship while it was in the possession of a
sub-charterer.43 The respective charter party agreements provided for
arbitration between the shipowner and the charterer and between the
charterer and the sub-charterer, but not between the shipowner and the
sub-charterer. The shipowner, unable to compel arbitration with the
sub-charterer due to lack of privity, demanded arbitration with the char-
terer to recover for the damage to the ship. The charterer, in turn, de-
manded arbitration with the sub-charterer for indemnity of any awards
resulting from the first arbitration.
Faced with two separate arbitration proceedings, the charterer peti-
tioned the court for an order of consolidation. The sub-charterer op-
posed the application on the grounds that: (1) such an order would
compel arbitration between the sub-charterer and the shipowner, a party
with whom the sub-charterer had no contractual relationship; (2) the ad-
ded complexity of a consolidated proceeding would increase the risk of
arbitral error; and (3) the arbitrations were governed by the Federal Ar-
bitration Act ("FAA") and thus not susceptible to consolidation under
state law."
Overruling the Appellate Division, the Court of Appeals held that
New York courts did have the power to order consolidated arbitrations
to "avoid the possibility of conflicting awards as well as the additional
time and expense of separate proceedings" 4 when: (1) common issues of
law and fact exist; and (2) no substantial right would be prejudiced. Ad-
dressing the contention that the court lacked authority to order consoli-
proceeding' and that under section 96 of the Civil Practice Act there was judicial power to consoli-
date special proceedings 'whenever it can be done without prejudice to a substantial right'." County
of Sullivan v. Edward Nezelek, Inc., 42 N.Y.2d 123, 127, 366 N.E.2d 72, 74, 397 N.Y.S.2d 371, 374
(1977).
With the repeal of the Civil Practice Act in 1962 and the enactment of the Civil Practice Law
and Rules ("CPLR"), the classification of arbitration as a "special proceeding" was discarded. N.Y.
Civ. PRAc. L. & R. 7501-04 (McKinney 1980). As a result, New York courts no longer had express
statutory authority to order consolidation of arbitrations.
42 26 N.Y.2d 157, 257 N.E.2d 624, 309 N.Y.S.2d 165; see also Chariot Textiles Corp. v. Wan-
nalancit Textile Co., 18 N.Y.2d 793, 221 N.E.2d 913, 275 N.Y.S.2d 382 (1966) (mem.) (consolida-
tion of three arbitration proceedings upheld).
43 A sub-charterer may also be referred to as a voyage charterer.
44 Maritime actions are governed under the Federal Arbitration Act 9 U.S.C. § 1 (1988).
45 Vigo, 26 N.Y.2d at 162, 257 N.E.2d at 626, 309 N.Y.S.2d at 168.
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dation since the FAA did not provide for such a procedure, the court
concluded that:
[A]ssuming the applicability of Federal law to the issue of consolida-
tion, it is not at all clear that the Federal courts would be powerless to
or would refuse to order consolidation were they faced with this fac-
tual situation. Indeed, the contention as to a lack of power to do so
flies in the face of the provisions of the Federal Rules of Civil Proce-
dure. Rule 42 (subd. [a]) provides expressly for consolidation in situa-
tions involving common questions of law or fact and the Federal Rules
generally are made applicable to the Federal Arbitration Act as to
matters of procedure not covered by the latter (rule 81, subd. [a], par.
[3]) and the Arbitration Act is silent as to the question of consolidating
arbitration proceedings. There is thus explicit authority for such
consolidation. 4 6
In holding that the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provided authority
to order consolidated arbitrations, the New York Court of Appeals laid a
foundation on which many federal courts now rely.
The court's holding in Vigo merits examination in two respects.
First, in enunciating the threshold requirement for consolidation, the
court held that the burden of proving prejudice to a substantial right was
on the party seeking to avoid consolidation. In so holding, however, the
court failed to define what constituted a substantial right and under what
circumstances such a right would be prejudiced.47 With respect to the
sub-charterer in Vigo, the court merely stated that, "The mere desire to
have one's dispute heard separately does not, by itself, constitute a 'sub-
stantial right'. '4  This summary analysis of the prejudice standard de-
means the contractual relationship between the parties and merely serves
as a "bootstrap" to fulfill its own threshold requirement for effecting con-
solidation. The court neglected to address the fact that an order of con-
solidation would not only compel arbitration between two parties who
had no contractual relationship, but would also dilute the parties' power
to appoint the arbitral tribunal in accordance with the terms of their
respective arbitration clauses.49 Contrary to the court's contentions, the
46 Id. at 162-63, 257 N.E.2d 626-27, 309 N.Y.S.2d 169. For a brief discussion on the use of
Rules 81(a)(3) and 42(a) as mentioned in Vigo, see Miller, Maritime Disputes, supra note 24, at 59.
47 See Hascher, supra note 10, at 131 & n.23 (objecting that the court's two part test ignores the
question of privity, and fails to adequately define the standards for determining whether a substantial
right has been prejudiced).
48 Vigo, 26 N.Y.2d at 162, 257 N.E.2d at 626, 309 N.Y.S.2d at 168.
49 The respective arbitration clauses all provided for the two-to-one method of panel appoint-
ment in stating that, "the matter in dispute shall be referred to three persons at New York, one to be
appointed by each of the parties hereto, and the third by the two so chosen." Id. at 160, 257 N.E.2d
at 625, 309 N.Y.S.2d at 167 (1970).
Courts dealing with the issue of panel selection at the federal level have recognized the parties'
right to appoint the arbitrators in accordance with the provisions of the arbitration clause. For a
1990]
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order of consolidation clearly affected the parties substantive rights by
altering the method of panel selection provided for in the arbitration
clauses.
The court's cursory analysis is troublesome because it raises the is-
sue of whether the right to have one's dispute heard in accordance with
the terms of the arbitration agreement would ever be considered a sub-
stantial right." Indeed, one commentator has suggested that "[s]uch
lack of precision leaves the party objecting to consolidation with an im-
possible burden of proof to meet since it will never be in a position to
demonstrate how prejudice would result from a consolidation order.""1
The second aspect of the Vigo opinion which merits examination is
the court's reliance on the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. In holding
that the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provided authority for court
ordered consolidation, the court not only failed to consider section four
of the FAA, which requires that arbitration proceed in the manner pro-
vided for in the parties' agreement, but also whether it was "within the
competence of the promulgator of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
to have legislated in the field of the substantive rights of the parties."5 "
In this respect, reliance on the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure appears
to be a pretext used by the courts to find the authority to order
consolidation.
The significance of the court's holding in Vigo, although arguably
flawed, should not be overlooked. 3 The analysis of the Vigo court sup-
plied the foundation that the federal courts ultimately used to find the
authority to order consolidated arbitrations. While the court's holding in
Vigo is still good law in New York, its basis, continues to foster' heated
debate at the federal level. For this reason, the wisdom of the court's
decision and the propriety of its reliance on the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure can only be properly assessed after a discussion of the treat-
ment of the problem at the federal level.
B. Consolidation in the Federal Courts
Following the lead of the New York courts, the general rule in the
United States was that a court had the power to consolidate arbitration
proceedings as long as common issues existed and no substantial right
complete discussion on consolidated arbitrations and panel selection at the federal level, see infra
text accompanying notes 81-84.
50 See Hascher, supra note 10, at 132.
51 Id. at 132 n.23.
52 Miller, Maritime Disputes, supra note 24, at 59 (questioning the validity of the courts reli-
ance on the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure in finding power to ordered consolidation).
53 "[A] new procedural road was now open for the convenience of middlemen such as ship
charterers, and it soon became well traveled." Id.
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would be prejudiced. 4 However, in the absence of express statutory au-
thority for consolidated arbitrations"5 and in light of recent Supreme
Court decisions on the sanctity of an arbitration clause and the scope of
the FAA,56 disputes have arisen over the authority of federal courts to
order consolidation.57 As a result of this dispute, the federal circuit
courts are split on the question of whether the judiciary has the power to
order consolidated arbitrations absent the express consent of all parties. 8
While consolidation clearly compels arbitration between parties who
are not in privity of contract, separate hearings present the possibility of
inconsistent awards and inefficient proceedings. The result is a funda-
mental conflict in the goals of the arbitral process which has resulted in a
split among the federal courts.
At the federal level, the question of a court's power to order consoli-
dation in maritime disputes was first addressed in Compania Espanola de
Petroleos, S.A. v. Nereus Shipping S.A. 9 In that case the Second Circuit
Court of Appeals held that a district court could order consolidation
under the appropriate circumstances. 6°
The dispute in Nereus involved a shipowner, a charterer, and a guar-
antor. Nereus (the shipowner) had a charter party with Hidrocarburos y
Derivados (the charterer) which Compania Espanola de Petroleos (the
guarantor) agreed to guarantee.6 The charter party between the ship-
owner and the charterer provided for arbitration of "[a]ny and all differ-
ences and disputes of whatsoever nature arising out of [the] [c]harter. ' 62
The arbitration clause further provided that disputes would be decided
by a three member panel, with one arbitrator to be appointed by each
party while the third would be appointed by the two arbitrators so
chosen.
In a separate agreement, referred to as addendum number two,
54 See M. DOMKE, supra note 6, § 27.02, at 413-14.
55 See Stipanowich, supra note 11, at 491 n.88. "Neither the Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C.
sections 1-14 (1982), nor the Uniform Arbitration Act, 7 U.L.A. 1-229 (West 1985), contains any
reference to consolidation of separate arbitrations." Id.
56 See Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc. v. Byrd, 470 U.S. 213 (1985); Moses H. Cone Memorial
Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1 (1983).
57 See Elmarina, Inc. v. Comexas N.V., 679 F. Supp. 388, 390 (S.D.N.Y. 1988); Consolidation
of Arbitrations, 10(1) LAW. ARB. LETTER 5 (1986).
58 The first, second, third, fourth, and sixth circuits have all recognized authority for judicially
ordered consolidation under appropriate circumstances, while the fifth and ninth circuits have re-
fused to order consolidation absent written authority in the arbitration clause.
59 527 F.2d 966 (2d Cir. 1975), cert denied, 426 U.S. 936 (1976).
60 Id. at 975.
61 The Charter Party was a three year maritime contract for the transportation of 600,000 long
tons of petroleum products. The contract provided for transport from the Persian Gulf to Europe
and the Mediterranean. Id. at 969.
62 Id.
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which was signed by all three parties, the guarantor agreed that "should
HIDECA [the charterer] default in payment or performance of its obli-
gations under the Charter Party, we will perform the balance of the con-
tract and assume the rights and obligations of HIDECA on the same
terms and conditions as contained in the Charter Party. '6 3
Upon the alleged default of the charterer, the shipowner notified the
guarantor as required in addendum number two. Ultimately, the ship-
owner demanded arbitration with both the charterer and the guarantor
under their respective contracts."4 Through a series of procedural ma-
neuvers and tactical considerations, the shipowner manipulated the pro-
ceedings so that the arbitration with the guarantor would take place
before the arbitration with the charterer. As the court pointed out:
If successful this strategy would be very advantageous to Nereus [the
shipowner] and very prejudicial to Hideca [the charterer] and Cepsa
[the guarantor] as the critical question or congeries of questions to be
decided by the arbitrators relative to the alleged default by Hideca
would first be decided in an arbitration to which Hideca was not a
party, despite the fact that Hideca had access to the evidence relative
to the alleged default and Cepsa did not.65
Since the liability of the guarantor was contingent on whether or not the
charterer had defaulted, the court reasoned that separate proceedings
would almost certainly result in prejudice and inconsistent results.66
Finding that the district court's order of consolidation would alleviate
this problem, the court of appeals upheld the order.67
Although the court did not need to go further after finding that ad-
dendum number two created privity between all parties, the court
adopted the reasoning of Vigo,68 which held that Rules 42(a) and 81(a)(3)
of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provided authority to order con-
solidation where common questions of law and fact were present. 69 The
63 Id. at 969-70. This provision was subject to the requirement that the shipowner provide the
guarantor with written notice of the charterer's default.
It should be noted that the court found that addendum number two created a contractual rela-
tionship between the parties whereby all were bound to arbitrate with each other. In this respect the
court reasoned that the parties had consented to consolidated arbitrations.
64 Although the guarantor denied that it was bound to enter into arbitration with the ship-
owner, the court held that by assuming all of the rights and obligations of the charterer in addendum
number two, the guarantor had in fact agreed to be bound to arbitration with the shipowner. Id. at
974.
65 Id. at 970.
66 Id. at 974.
67 Id. at 975.
68 See Miller, Maritime Disputes, supra note 24, at 59.
69 Rule 42(a) states:
[w]hen actions involving a common question of law or fact are pending before the
court, it may order a joint hearing or trial of any or all the matters in issue in the actions; it
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court reasoned that use of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure was com-
pletely consistent with the FAA in that "the liberal purposes of the Fed-
eral Arbitration Act clearly require that this act be interpreted so as to
permit... consolidation of arbitration proceedings in proper cases, such
as the one before us."7
By applying the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure via a liberal inter-
pretation of the FAA, the court held that consolidation could be ordered
even in the absence of a contractual relationship between the parties.71
While this proposition has since been disputed, those courts which have
found power to order consolidation continue to apply a liberal interpreta-
tion of the FAA.72
To its credit, the Nereus court, unlike the court in Vigo, addressed
the importance of the terms and conditions of the arbitration clause.
Chief among the court's concerns was the arbitrators selection provi-
sion.73 Because the arbitration clause provided that any disputes should
be heard by a three member panel, with each party to select one of the
members, the court found that this provision could not be equitably ap-
plied where the arbitration would involve more than two parties.74 The
court was cognizant of the fact that strict adherence to this provision, as
in Vigo, would lead to the dilution of the parties' power and in effect
rewrite the arbitration clause.
In an effort to achieve the most equitable results, the court ordered
that the consolidated proceeding be heard by a five member panel.75
Under this method, each party would select one arbitrator and the re-
maining two arbitrators would be selected jointly by the three arbitrators
duly appointed by each party. In ordering the arbitrations to proceed
before a five member panel, the court stated that:
may order all the actions consolidated; and it may make such orders concerning proceed-
ings therein as may tend to avoid unnecessary costs or delay.
FED. R. Crv. P. 42(a).
Rule 81(a)(3) states:
[i]n proceedings under Title 9, USC, relating to arbitration, or under the Act of May
20, 1926, ch. 347, § 9 (44 Stat. 585), USC, Title 45, § 159, relating to boards of arbitration
of railway labor disputes, these rules apply only to the extent that matters of procedure are
not provided for in those statutes. These rules apply to proceedings to compel the giving of
testimony or production of documents in accordance with a subpoena issued by an officer
or agency of the United States under any statute of the United States except as otherwise
provided by statute or by rules of the district court or by order of the court in the
proceedings.
FED. R. Civ. P. 81(a)(3).
70 Nereus, 527 F.2d at 975.
71 Id. at 973-75.
72 Id.
73 Id. at 975.
74 Id.
75 Id.
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Having considered at length a variety of alternatives for the composi-
tion of the panel and for the selection of the panel members, we are
convinced that the method we have chosen is the only method that will
give each of the parties fair and equitable treatment.... We believe
that it is important that each party have its own representative, a pro-
vision which also appears in the contract .... 76
The court's attempt to give effect to the parties' contracts, while admira-
ble, has a limited effect at best.
Although the decision of the Nereus court kept the parties' power to
appoint the arbitrators intact, many questions have been raised with re-
spect to both the propriety and practicability of expanding the size of the
arbitration panel."
While a five member panel may prove efficient in the case where
only three parties are involved in the dispute, the scenario becomes more
complicated as the number of parties to the dispute increases. A good
illustration of the problem is provided by a hypothetical construction
contract. When an owner contracts with both an architect and a con-
tractor and the contractor in turn contracts with various subcontractors
for particular jobs, any dispute which arises could involve an infinite
number of parties.78 Thus, the concept of the five member panel is lim-
ited by the number of parties to the dispute.
Some commentators have appropriately inquired whether the court
would be willing to expand the size of the arbitration panel infinitely to
accommodate all of the parties.79 "Should the system be infinitely multi-
plied so as to have, say, seven or nine arbitrators when four or five parties
are ordered to consolidate their arbitration proceedings?"8 0 Because
such a solution is impractical, it would appear that the court would have
to deal with these situations on an ad hoc basis. This creates uncertainty
and makes it unclear whether the parties could retain any power to ap-
point an arbitrator if consolidation were ordered in multiparty disputes
involving more than four parties.
In addition to the problems inherent in the methodology of using
the five member panel, use of the panel under conditions similar to the
facts in the Nereus case create additional questions. Where a court or-
ders a five member panel to preside over the proceedings, the panel selec-
76 Id.
77 Id. See Hascher, supra note 10, at 136, stating that, "If assembled, the enlarged panel will
have to face the difficulties and technicalities of multiparty hearings."
78 Consider the case of construction delays. Typically, when faced with a delay, the owner will
seek damages from either the architect, the contractor, or both. The architect may in turn seek
indemnity from the contractor, or vice versa, and the contractor may seek indemnification from any
number of subcontractors. Thus, the number of parties to the dispute is not predictable.
79 See Hascher, supra note 10, at 136.
80 Id.
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tion provision provided for in the bilateral arbitration contract is
necessarily altered. Therefore, when the arbitration clause provides for a
specific method of panel appointment, the composition of the five mem-
ber arbitral tribunal is not in accordance with the provisions of the arbi-
tration clause. The question thus becomes whether an arbitration award
which is not rendered in strict accordance with the provisions of the arbi-
tration clause could be enforced abroad under the Convention on the
Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards ("New York
Convention"). 8 This problem is inherent in the issue of compulsory
consolidation and is not unique to the five member panel.
Since Nereus, courts in the first,8 2 third,83 fourth,84 and sixth85 cir-
cuits have found authority for judicially ordered consolidation. While
not all of these courts have used the five member panel method, all have
agreed that consolidated arbitrations are essential if inconsistent awards
and duplicative proceedings are to be avoided.86 However, the scope of a
court's power has not been adequately defined and it is unclear how far
the proponents of consolidation would be willing to go in the name of
economy and efficiency. Basic differences in arbitration clauses, such as
reference to the rules of different institutions,87 different choice of law
81 See Burmah Oil Tankers Ltd. v. Marlucidez Armadora S.A., No. 80 Civ. 5324 (S.D.N.Y.
Jan. 22, 1981).
The New York Convention has approximately 77 signatories and provides for the enforcement
of arbitral awards rendered in foreign jurisdictions.
Article V of the New York Convention provides that:
1. Recognition and enforcement of the award may be refused, at the request of the
party against whom it is invoked, only if that party furnishes to the competent authority
where the recognition and enforcement is sought, proof that:
(d) The composition of the arbitral authority or the arbitral procedure was not in
accordance with the agreement of the parties, or, failing such agreement, was not in ac-
cordance with the law of the country where the arbitration took place[.]
Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, June 10, 1958, 21
U.S.T. 2517, T.I.A.S. No. 6997, 330 U.N.T.S. 38 [hereinafter New York Convention].
For an in depth discussion on the potential problems of enforcement of consolidated awards
under the New York Convention see infra text accompanying note 137.
82 See New England Energy Inc. v. Keystone Shipping Co., 855 F.2d 1 (1st Cir. 1988) (author-
ity to consolidate arbitration proceedings based on state statute), cert. denied, 109 S. Ct. 1527 (1989).
83 See Gavlik Constr. Co. v. H.F. Campbell Co., 526 F.2d 777 (3rd Cir. 1975).
84 See Maxum Founds., Inc. v. Salus Corp., 817 F.2d 1086 (4th Cir. 1987) (related contracts
between project owner and general contractor and between general contractor and subcontractor
sufficiently revealed parties' intention to consolidate arbitrations).
85 See Hoover Group Inc. v. Probabla & Associates, 710 F. Supp. 677 (N.D. Ohio 1989).
86 See supra notes 74-77 and accompanying text.
87 See Hascher, supra note 10, at 128. "American courts have usually held that consolidation
cannot be ordered when the arbitration clauses refer to the arbitration rules of different arbitration
institutions." Id.
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provisions," or conflicts as to the situs of the proceeding, may present
insurmountable obstacles to compulsory consolidation. Due to the ab-
sence of statutory authority to guide the courts at the federal level, the
conflicts which arise because of conflicting provisions in the arbitration
clauses will have to be dealt with on an ad hoc basis. In this respect,
court ordered consolidation may undermine the predictability of results
which has been a stabilizing feature of the arbitral process.8 9
The need for efficiency and consistency in the arbitral process, while
important, has not been the paramount issue to the courts which have
refused to order consolidated arbitrations. Those courts and opponents
of court ordered consolidation, argue that an arbitration clause repre-
sents a contractual allocation of risk which may not be disturbed, unless
the same conditions that would allow reformation of an ordinary con-
tract exist.90
As previously noted, courts ordering consolidated arbitrations have
held "that the liberal purposes of the Federal Arbitration Act... require
that [the] act be interpreted so as to permit and even to encourage the
consolidation of arbitration proceedings in proper cases."9 In this re-
spect, a liberal reading of the FAA has been the cornerstone on which
the courts have relied for the power to order consolidated arbitrations.92
Courts which have refused to order consolidation maintain that sec-
tion four of the FAA prohibits them from consolidating proceedings
without the express consent of the parties. These courts argue that inas-
much as the arbitration clause is a creature of contract, arbitration be-
tween parties who are not in privity may not be imposed absent the
express consent of the parties. Thus, they maintain that reliance on the
"liberal purposes" of the FAA is misplaced.93
At the heart of the controversy currently surrounding the issue of
88 But see infra, note 128, arguing that "consolidation is not barred when the contracts in-
volved are governed by different laws."
89 For a discussion of the importance of predictability, see M. DOMKE, supra note 6, § § 1.03,
8:02 at 9.
90 See eg., Weyerhaeuser Co. v. Western Seas Shipping Co., 743 F.2d 635 (9th Cir.), cert.
denied, 469 U.S. 1061 (1984); In re Reefer Express Lines Pty. Ltd., No. 86 Civ. 4490, (S.D.N.Y.
1987); Ore & Chem. Corp. v. Stinnes Interoil, Inc., 606 F. Supp. 1510 (S.D.N.Y. 1985) [hereinafter
Stinnes 1].
91 Compania Espanola de Petroleos, S.A. v. Nereus Shipping, S.A., 527 F.2d 966,975 (2d Cir.
1975), cert denied, 426 U.S. 936 (1976), quoted in Weyerhaeuser, 743 F.2d at 637.
92 Use of the Federal Rules via a liberal interpretation of the FAA may be inferred to mean
that pro-consolidation courts place a greater emphasis on the efficiency of proceedings, rather than
on the sanctity of the arbitration contract. To this extent, one commentator has suggested that,
"Arbitration is what the parties are interested in. Consolidation is merely a device that lessens litiga-
tion problems for lawyers, judges and arbitrators." Hascher, supra note 10, at 134.
See also G. Aksen, supra note 2, at 5-7; Stipanowich, supra note 11, at 511.
93 See Weyerhaeuser, 743 F.2d at 637; Stinnes 1, 606 F. Supp. at 1512.
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consolidated arbitrations is the decision of the Ninth Circuit Court of
Appeals in Weyerhaeuser Co. v. Western Seas Shipping Co. 94 Rejecting
the reasoning of Nereus,95 the Weyerhaeuser court held that under the
FAA its authority was narrowly circumscribed and thus an order of con-
solidation was precluded absent the express consent of all parties. Ap-
plying a literal construction of the FAA, 96 the court held that:
[W]e can only determine whether a written arbitration agreement ex-
ists, and if it does, enforce it "in accordance with its terms." As the
district court noted, this provision "comports with the statute's under-
lying premise that arbitration is a creature of contract, and that "[a]n
agreement to arbitrate before a special tribunal is, in effect, a special-
ized kind of forum-selection clause that posits not only the situs of suit
but also the procedure to be used in resolving the dispute."
97
In holding that judicial authority was narrowly circumscribed under the
FAA, the court determined that the only issue properly before the bench
was whether all of the parties were privy to a written arbitration agree-
ment providing for consolidation. In the absence of such an agreement,
the court found that it did not have the power to compel arbitration
between non-contracting parties.98
Two years after Weyerhaeuser, the reasoning of the Ninth Circuit
Court of Appeals was adopted by the District Court for the Southern
District of New York in Ore & Chemical Corp. v. Stinnes Interoil, Inc. ,"
when it declined to follow the Nereus precedent and denied a petition to
94 743 F.2d 635 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1061 (1984).
95 See supra text accompanying notes 59-76.
96 Section 4 of the FAA provides:
The court shall hear the parties, and upon being satisfied that the making of the agreement
for arbitration or the failure to comply therewith is not in issue, the court shall make an
order directing the parties to proceed to arbitration in accordance with the terms of the
agreement.... If the [fact-finder] find[s] that an agreement for arbitration was made in
writing and that there is a default in proceeding thereunder, the court shall make an order
summarily directing the parties to proceed with the arbitration in accordance with the terms
thereof.
9 U.S.C. § 4 (1988) (emphasis added).
97 Weyerhaeuser, 743 F.2d at 637 (quoting Scherk v. Alberto-Culver Co., 417 U.S. 506, 519
(1974)).
98 Finding the paramount issue to be that arbitration is a creature of contract, the district court
pointed out that:
Weyerhaeuser's argument, that consolidation would not force respondents to arbitrate dis-
putes they had not agreed to arbitrate since consolidation does not eradicate the identity of
the individual matters consolidated, misses the point. The agreement to arbitrate only
certain disputes or only in a certain manner represents a contractual allocation of risk that
the Court may not disturb absent the kind of showing required for reformation of an ordi-
nary contract. The standards for consolidation under Rule 42(a) are therefore irrelevant.
Weyerhaeuser Co. v. Western Seas Shipping Co., 568 F. Supp. 1220, 1222 (citation omitted) (N.D.
Calif. 1983), aff'd, 743 F.2d 635 (9th Cir.), cert denied, 469 U.S. 1061 (1984).
99 Stinnes I, 606 F. Supp. 1510 (S.D.N.Y. 1985).
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compel consolidated arbitration.100
Citing Weyerhaeuser, the court in Stinnes held that section four of
the FAA prohibited the court from ordering consolidation where the
parties were not in privity or did not provide for consolidation in the
respective arbitration clauses. To hold otherwise, the court reasoned,
would be contrary to recent decisions of the U.S. Supreme Court,
10'
which had interpreted the scope of the FAA and "reject[ed] the sugges-
tion that the overriding goal of the Arbitration Act was to promote the
expeditious resolution of claims.""0 2 The court's decision is clearly sup-
ported by the Supreme Court's holding in Dean Witter Reynolds v. Byrd,
where Justice Marshall writing for the court stated that:
We... are not persuaded by the argument that the conflict be-
tween the two goals of the Arbitration Act - enforcement of private
agreements and the encouragement of efficient and speedy dispute res-
olution - must be resolved in favor of the latter in order to realize the
intent of the drafters. The preeminent concern of Congress in passing
the Act was to enforce private agreements into which the parties had
entered, and that concern requires that we rigorously enforce agreements
to arbitrate, even if the result is "piecemeal" litigation .... 103
In finding that the court's authority was narrowly circumscribed
under the FAA, Judge Edelstein stated that "the Second Circuit's reli-
ance in Nereus on the 'liberal purposes' of the Arbitration Act was mis-
placed. 9 U.S.C. § 2 is a congressional declaration of a liberal policy
favoring arbitration agreements, not of reforming them."" °
The Stinnes court also took issue with Nereus' use of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure to effectuate consolidation in the absence of an
100 In rejecting Nereus, the court stated that:
A district court ... should not rely on older precedents that have been rejected in later
decisions. The Nereus decision has been rejected by a district court and Court of Appeals
for the Ninth Circuit, and is contrary to recent Supreme Court pronouncements on the
scope of the Federal Arbitration Act. Accordingly, this court opines that if the Court of
Appeals for the Second Circuit were to reconsider the issue, it would overrule Nereus, and
hold that a district court does not have the power under 9 U.S.C. § 4 to compel consoli-
dated arbitration, where the parties did not provide for consolidated arbitration in the
arbitration agreement.
Stinnes 1, 606 F. Supp. at 1512-13 (citations omitted).
101 See Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc. v. Byrd, 470 U.S. 213 (1985); Moses H. Cone Memorial
Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1 (1983); Scherk v. Alberto-Culver Co., 417 U.S. 506
(1974).
"[P]assage of the [FAA] was motivated, first and foremost, by a congressional desire to enforce
agreements into which parties had entered, and we must not overlook this principle objective when
construing the statute, or allow the fortuitous impact of the Act on efficient dispute resolution to
overshadow the underlying motivation." Byrd, 470 U.S. at 220.
102 Byrd, 470 U.S. at 219.
103 Byrd, 470 U.S. at 221 (emphasis added).
104 Stinnes 1, 606 F. Supp. at 1513 (citation omitted).
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agreement between the parties. The court held that Rule 81(a)(3) was
precluded by 9 U.S.C. § 4 insofar as it would alter the terms of the arbi-
tration agreement. With respect to Rule 42(a), the court held that:
[I]t is well established that '[w]hen contracting parties stipulate that
disputes will be submitted to arbitration, they relinquish the right to
certain procedural niceties which are normally associated with a for-
mal trial.' One of those 'procedural niceties' is Rule 42(a)'s provision
for consolidation of related actions. Indeed, Rule 42(a) by its express
terms only applies to 'actions pending before the court.' For the court
to consolidate cases, the actions to be consolidated must both be pending
before the court for all purposes. The 'actions' which petitioners seek to
consolidate are the arbitrations, which are not now 'pending before the
court.' Accordingly, Rule 42(a) does not provide authority for the
court to order consolidation of the arbitration proceedings. 10 5
In light of the court's analysis, use of the Federal Rules to effectuate
consolidation in the absence of an agreement between the parties is
inappropriate.
Upon denial of Ore & Chemical Corporation's petition for an order
of consolidation, the court in Stinnes gave the parties a specified time
period in which to reach an agreement for the selection of arbitrators.
Having failed to agree on the selection of the arbitrators within the speci-
fied time period, Ore & Chemical Corporation petitioned the court to
appoint the same arbitrator to both proceedings. 10 6 Because the arbitra-
tion clause was only one sentence and contained no reference to the selec-
tion of arbitrators, the court held that it was bound by section five to
105 Id. at 1514-15 (footnotes omitted) (emphasis added).
A further analysis of Rule 42(a) indicates that the rule was intended for convenience and econ-
omy of administration, as well as to provide justice to the parties. Indeed, under Rule 42(a) the
court has broad discretion, and need not obtain the consent of the parties to order consolidation.
Rather, the court alone weighs the benefits and the cost of consolidating actions. In this respect,
Rule 42(a) is contrary to the goals of the arbitral process as it is a device for the convenience of
judges conferring only incidental benefit upon the parties. See 9 C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, FED-
ERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE: CVmL §§ 2381-92 (1971).
What is a useful device in litigation, such as Rule 42(a), may be wholly inappropriate in arbitra-
tion. Proponents of the use of Rule 42(a) fail to differentiate between arbitration and litigation. As
one commentator has pointed out:,
"Arbitration suffers from a comparison with the courts .... It isn't 'just like the courts.'
In fact, its strongest points lie in those areas where it most widely differs from the courts.
Arbitration and litigation have a similar goal. The proceedings of the two processes are
somewhat alike, principally because the arbitration proceeding has been altered to accom-
modate the lawyer... The major difference is the framework within which these questions
are examined. The rules of law which provide such a framework in litigation are at most a
minor part of the arbitration process."
M. DOMKE, supra note 6, § 1:01, at 3 (quoting AMERICAN MANAGEMENT ASSOCiATION, RESOLV-
ING BuSINESs DISPUTES: THE POTENTIAL OF COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION 102 (1965)).
106 Ore & Chemical Corp. v. Stinnes Interoil, Inc., 611 F. Supp. 237 (S.D.N.Y. 1985) [hereinaf-
ter Stinnes I1].
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appoint a single arbitrator to hear each of the separate disputes. The
court further held that although it had no authority under 9 U.S.C. § 4
to order consolidation, the statute did not bar it from appointing the
same arbitrator to preside over the separate proceedings.1 7 The court
avoided overstepping its authority by ordering consolidation, but re-
mained mindful of the need for consistent results and efficiency in the
proceedings. 08
Stating that "[o]ne arbitrator will be in a better position to deter-
mine whether the two actions should be consolidated,""1° the court left
unanswered the question of whether it would enforce an arbitration
award resulting from a consolidated proceeding not provided for in the
arbitration clauses. Insofar as the arbitration agreements provided that
any disputes would be settled under the laws of New York, it is possible
that the court intended that the arbitrator would have the authority to
order consolidation in accordance with state law. However, if this is the
case, the court may have jumped the gun by overlooking the fact that
under New York law it is the court and not the arbitrator who must
make the decision to order consolidation in the "sensitive and wise exer-
cise of judicial discretion."' 10
In addition, this solution may not be practical in arbitrations which
are administered by one of the major institutions. As previously dis-
cussed, none of the major arbitral institutions have general consolidation
provisions which would allow the arbitrator to order consolidation ab-
sent the express consent of the parties. Therefore, the court's suggestion
in the Ore & Chemical Corp. case that the arbitrator should order consol-
idation may not be possible absent a source of statutory or contractual
authority. 11  While the court failed to provide a detailed plan regarding
how the arbitrator could effect consolidation, its determination that only
the arbitrator is in a position to order consolidation would probably be
better received by opponents of court ordered consolidation who argue
that "procedural matters such as consolidation are properly the concern
107 Stinnes I, 611 F. Supp. at 241.
108 See Barron, Court-ordered Consolidation ofArbitration Proceedings in the United States, 4 J.
INT'L ARB. 81 (1987).
109 Stinnes I, 611 F. Supp. at 241.
110 County of Sullivan v. Nezelek, 42 N.Y.2d 123, 128, 397 N.Y.S.2d 371, 375, 366 N.E.2d 72,
75 (1977).
111 Should the arbitrators order consolidation of their own volition, the resulting award may
encounter enforcement difficulties under both domestic and international law. Such an award could
be attacked on the basis that the arbitrator lacked authority to order consolidation, and thus create
obstacles to enforcement and uncertainty as to the usefulness of an arbitration clause. Inasmuch as
the objective of the arbitral process is to eliminate uncertainty where it exists, it would not be pru-
dent to allow an arbitrator to order consolidation absent some source of power which would enable
the order to withstand collateral attack.
Vol. 22:341
CONSOLIDATED ARBITRATIONS
of the duly-appointed arbitration panel. '112
The court's holding in Stinnes that a district court does not have the
power to order consolidation has created a dispute within the Southern
District of New York.'13 Although Nereus is still good law in the Second
Circuit, the district courts in the Southern District remain divided. In
this respect, the Southern District of New York, has become a micro-
cosm of the conflict which currently exists among the federal circuit
courts.
114
As a result of the conflict among the federal circuit courts, one com-
mentator has suggested that "court ordered consolidation [in the United
States] is no longer predictable." 1 5 Other commentators have responded
that rules relating to court ordered consolidation are predictable, so long
as the practitioner is familiar with the rules of the various circuits.' 16
These commentators treat the Stinnes case as an anomaly and point out
that the Second Circuit Court of Appeals has subsequently affirmed an
order of consolidation by a district court in Cable Belt Conveyors, Inc. v.
Alumina Partners of Jamaica."7 However, these commentators fail to
remember that the purpose of the FAA and the arbitral system in general
is to eliminate the confusion surrounding different state laws, and set
forth a comprehensive body of law that could be selected and relied on by
the parties.
The current split among the federal circuit courts rests entirely on
the construction given to the FAA. Thus, either Congress must amend
the FAA to provide clear guidance on this issue, or the U.S. Supreme
Court must grant certiorari and clearly construe the FAA. Until either
Congress of the Supreme Court acts, international practitioners should
pay careful attention to the rules in the various circuits to ascertain the
various positions as precisely as possible. It should be noted, however,
that anything other than a strict construction of the FAA would be
counter-intuitive inasmuch as the statute seeks to create uniformity and
predictability where parties of different nationalities are concerned.
C. State Statutes
Two states, Massachusetts and California, have amended their arbi-
tration statutes to provide statutory authority for court ordered
consolidation.
112 Stipanowich, supra note 11, at 509.
113 See Elmarina, Inc. v. Comexas, N.V., 679 F. Supp. 388 (S.D.N.Y. 1988).
114 See id. at 388 (S.D.N.Y. 1988); In re Reefer Express Lines Pty. Ltd., No. 86 Civ. 4490
(S.D.N.Y. 1987).
115 Barron, supra note 107, at 81.
116 Branson & Wallace, Court-Ordered Consolidated Arbitrations in the United States: Recent
Authority Assures Parties the Choice, 5 J. I.r'L ARB. 89 (1988).
117 No. 86 Civ. 7980 (S.D.N.Y. 1989).
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1. Massachusetts
The Massachusetts Uniform Arbitration Act11 'was amended in
1977 to provide that:
A party aggrieved by the failure or refusal of another to agree to
consolidate one arbitration proceeding with another or others, for
which the method of appointment of the arbitrator or arbitrators is the
same, or to sever one arbitration proceeding from another or others,
may apply to the superior court for an order for such consolidation or
such severance. The court shall proceed summarily to the determina-
tion of the issue so raised. If a claimant under section twenty-nine of
chapter one hundred and forty-nine applies for an order of consolida-
tion or severance of such proceedings, the issue shall be decided under
the applicable provisions of said section twenty-nine of said chapter
one hundred and forty-nine governing consolidation or severance of
such actions; otherwise the issue shall be decided under the Massachu-
setts Rules of Civil Procedure governing consolidation and severance
of trials and the court shall issue an order accordingly. No provision in
any arbitration agreement shall bar or prevent action by the court under
this section." 9
Two important aspects of the statute are the provisions which stipu-
late that (1) the method of appointment for arbitrators must be the same
in the respective agreements; and (2) that the parties are not free to opt
out of consolidation by contractual agreement. These provisions are
somewhat inconsistent with respect to their intended goals. On the one
hand, the statute seeks to preserve the parties' rights to freely determine
and contract for a specific method of panel selection. On the other hand,
the statute frustrates freedom of contract by not allowing the parties to
contractually opt out of the provision. In prohibiting the parties from
opting out of the consolidation provision by contractual agreement, the
statute goes further than Nereus and its progeny and serves to totally
frustrate the basic principle of freedom to contract. 121 Indeed, no court
has ordered consolidation where such a procedure was specifically ex-
cluded by contractual agreement.12 1
The Massachusetts statute was drafted by the Associated Subcon-
tractors of Massachusetts in direct response to the 1976 amendment of
the AIA standard form document which prohibits consolidation absent
118 MAss. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 251, § 1-19 (West 1988).
119 Id. § 2A (emphasis added).
120 See Chicago Paper Handlers' & Electrotypers' Local No. 2 v. Chicago Tribune Co., 794
F.2d 1222 (7th Cir. 1986); Delgrosso v. Spang & Co., 769 F.2d 928 (3rd Cir.), cert. denied, 476 U.S.
1140 (1985). Hurlbut v. Gantshar, 674 F. Supp. 385 (D. Mass. 1987).
121 See Del E. Webb Constr. v. Richardson Hosp. Authority, 823 F.2d 145 (5th Cir. 1987)
(refusal to order consolidation because parties' agreement incorporated the AIA provision prohibit-
ing consolidation absent the express consent of the parties).
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the express written consent of the Architect. 122
The Massachusetts statute is particularly important to international
practitioners in light of the recent decision of the First Circuit Court of
Appeals in New England Energy, Inc. v. Keystone Shipping Co. 123 In
Keystone Shipping, the court held that the Massachusetts consolidation
provision was applicable to arbitrations governed under the FAA.124
Although the court did not make a definitive holding on the language in
the statute which prohibits parties from contractually opting out of con-
solidation, it gave a strong indication that state law could not prevail
over a contractual provision in the parties' agreement. In a footnote, the
court stated in dicta that:
The statute states that "[n]o provision in any arbitration agreement
shall bar or prevent action by the court under this section." Mass.
Gen. Laws Ann. ch. 251, § 2A. Because the parties' agreements in this
case do not refer to consolidation, we need not address whether federal
law bars the statute from superseding a contractual provision expressly
prohibiting consolidation. Supreme Court precedent strongly indi-
cates, however, that state law should not prevail over such privately
negotiated contractual provision."'
The court's language in this footnote indicates that for the time being,
the boilerplate provision in section 7.9.1 of AIA Document A201, which
prohibits consolidation, should prevail over state law in arbitrations gov-
erned under the FAA.
In addressing that portion of the court's opinion which held state
law applicable under the FAA, Judge Selya dissented stating:
In leaving the dimensions of the changed bargain to the vagaries of
state law, the majority demeans the quintessentially [sic] federal na-
ture of the rule of decision. In my mind, judicial recourse to a
salamagundi of differing state arbitration laws countervails the objec-
tives of the Federal Arbitration Act. Put another way, superimposing
Massachusetts' pro-consolidation policy on the expressed wishes of the
contracting parties unduly exults state law and, in the process subverts
the concept of "creating a body of federal substantive law of arbi-
trability, applicable to any arbitration agreement within the coverage
of the Act." In my estimation, Congress did not intend that the state-
law camel could so obtrusively stick its nose into the federal-law
tent. 126
122 See Hascher, supra note 10, at 138-39.
123 855 F.2d I (1st Cir. 1988) (Selya, J., dissenting), cert. denied, 109 S. Ct. 1527 (1989).
124 While this analysis deals only with that portion of the court's opinion which found state
law applicable under the FAA, it should be noted that the court, although not making any determi-
nations on the appropriateness of the use of the Federal Rules, reviewed the basic positions as out-
lined in Nereus and Weyerhaeuser and agreed with the Nereus interpretation of the FAA.
125 Keystone Shipping, 855 F.2d at 5 n.3 (citations omitted).
126 Id. at 10 (citations omitted).
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The reasoning in Judge Selya's dissent seems to be the most persuasive.
Since arbitration laws vary throughout the fifty states, the international
practitioner, or for that matter the domestic practitioner dealing with
arbitrations governed under the FAA, would be unable to rely on the
FAA in drafting an arbitration clause. This would introduce great un-
certainty into the arbitration process, because in drafting the arbitration
clause lawyers would be unable to ascertain in advance the applicable law
which would govern the resolution of disputes. In this respect, it would
seem that the intent of the FAA to create a uniform body of law would
be frustrated. As Judge Selya points out, practitioners should have the
right to rely on the FAA in arbitrations which are governed by that Act.
2. California
In 1978 the California legislature amended its arbitration statute to
provide for consolidation. 12 7 Under the California statute, the court may
order consolidation when:
(1) Separate arbitration agreements or proceedings exist between the
same parties; or one party is a party to a separate arbitration agree-
ment or proceeding with a third party; and
(2) The dispute arises from the same transaction or series of related
transactions; and (3) There is a common issue or issues of law or fact
creating the possibility of conflicting rulings by more than one arbitra-
tor or panel of arbitrators. 128
Unlike the Massachusetts statute, the California state courts have held
that a party may not preclude consolidation provisions by contractual
agreement. 129
Whether or not the California statute would be applied to arbitra-
tions governed under the FAA has not yet been determined. However,
given the Ninth Circuit's opposition to compelled consolidation in Wey-
erhaeuser, it is unlikely that the federal courts in California would apply
the consolidation provision absent the express consent of the parties. If
faced with the California statute, it is likely that the Ninth Circuit would
rule that section four of the FAA preempts state law, thereby making the
state statute irrelevant. Such a ruling would be in accordance with the
Weyerhaeuser holding that the court's power is narrowly circumscribed
under the FAA. However, since this issue has not been decided practi-
tioners who wish to avoid consolidation altogether should incorporate an
opt out provision in the arbitration clause.
127 CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 1281.3 (West 1982).
128 Id.
129 See Garden Grove Community Church v. Pittsburgh-Des Moines Steel Co., 140 Cal. App.
3d 251, 191 Cal. Rptr. 15 (1983).
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V. CONSOLIDATION OUTSIDE THE UNITED STATES
A. Jurisdictions Permitting Consolidation
Currently, only two jurisdictions other than the United States per-
mitted compulsory consolidation. These jurisdictions are Hong Kong
and the Netherlands.
Article 1046 of the Dutch Arbitration Act of 1986130 empowers the
president of the District Court in Amsterdam to "order consolidation of
the proceedings, unless the parties have agreed otherwise." 131 The presi-
dent may grant the parties' request for consolidation in whole or in
part.132 If the president orders consolidation of the entire proceeding,
the parties may jointly appoint the arbitrators and determine the rules
which shall apply. 133 If the parties are unable to agree on the appoint-
ment of arbitrators or the selection of the rules, the president will, at
request of the parties, make these decisions. 134 If the president orders
partial consolidation, he shall determine the issues to be consolidated.
35
As in the case of total consolidation, the president will choose the arbi-
trators and rules to be applied if the parties are unable to agree.
136
Unlike the California and Massachusetts statutes, the Dutch Arbi-
tration Act gives the parties the right to opt out of the consolidation
provision by contractual agreement. 137 However, even with the opt out
provision the Dutch Act has been criticized. One author has commented
that:
Under the new Dutch Act the parties can opt out of consolida-
tion. But it is not very clear when and by whom. A consolidation case
involves at least three parties. Is it sufficient that the parties in the first
arbitration agreed between themselves that there shall be no consolida-
tion, or must the agreement be made between all three (or more) par-
ties? . . . To leave it to the parties (whoever they are) to opt out
appears reasonable, but will it be a very practical solution?... At an
earlier stage, when drawing up various contracts related to a big pro-
ject, the chances of reaching an agreement to exclude consolidation are
greater. This presupposes that the parties are aware of the risk of con-
solidation .... It also supposes that the parties are aware of who will
be parties to the connected arbitration .... Since contracts are negoti-
130 DUTCH ARBITRATION ACT, IV Code of Civ. P. art. 1046 (1986).
131 See id., art. 1046.
132 The relevant portions of the Dutch Code of Civil Procedure are reproduced in English in
van den Berg, The Netherlands, in 2 INTERNATIONAL HANDBOOK ON COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION
1, Annex I (Supp. 7 Apr. 1987)[hereinafter van den Berg, The Netherlands].
133 Id., Annex I, art. 1046, para. 2 at 7.
134 Id., para. 3 at 7.
135 Id., para. 4 at 7.
136 Id.
137 Id., para. 1 at 7.
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ated at different times and in different places, it will not always be
possible to agree in advance; parties may be unknown to each other
until the question of consolidation arises. And then it is too late
138
While these concerns are legitimate, it would seem unrealistic to require
that all of the parties must agree to opt out of the proceeding at the time
of the dispute. Nor does it seem likely that the parties would know, in
advance, all of the possible participants of a future consolidated proceed-
ing. Rather, it appears that the opt out provision was included in the
Dutch Arbitration Act as an attempt to ensure the parties' freedom to
contract, by allowing them to unilaterally opt out in the event of a con-
solidated proceeding. Any other interpretation would, in practical terms,
nullify the provision and thus not comport with the legislative purpose in
enacting the statute.
If all parties were required to opt out at the time of the dispute, the
freedom which the provision contemplates would almost never be real-
ized insofar as it would always be to the advantage of one of the parties
to consolidate the proceedings. As one commentator has noted, "Axio-
matically, if arbitration is perceived to promote the interest of one party,
it may be seen to damage the interests of the other."1 39 This axiom ap-
plies with equal force to compulsory consolidation. If the statute re-
quired full agreement at the time of the dispute, the decision to exercise
the consolidation provision would rest entirely with the party who was
not seeking to opt out. Surely the legislature did not intend the applica-
tion of the provision to lie at the discretion of an adverse party.
Rather, a realistic interpretation of the opt out provision must be
considered in the entire context of the statute. Insofar as the statute
seeks to preserve freedom of contract, it must be read to allow any party
to unilaterally opt out at the time of the proceeding or require the parties
to exercise their opt out right at the time of contracting when they are on
equal terms and can bargain at arms length. Like any other part of the
arbitration clause, an agreement to opt out represents a contractual allo-
cation of risk which requires parties to negotiate the provision before the
event occurs.
In 1982, Hong Kong enacted a new Arbitration Ordinance which
included provisions for judicially ordered consolidation." Section 6B of
the Ordinance provides:
138 Jarvin, Consolidated Arbitrations, the New York Arbitration Convention and the Dutch Arbi-
tration Act 1986 - a Critique of Dr. van den Berg, 3 ARB. INT'L 254, 256-57 (1987)[hereinafter Cri-
tique of Dr. van den Berg].
139 Stipanowich, supra note 11, at 489 n.78 (quoting J. ACRET, CONSTRUCTION ARBrrRATiON
HANDBOOK, § 5.02, at 132-35 (1985)).
140 Arbitration Ordinance, LAWS OF HONG KONG, ch. 341, § 6B, reprinted in Miller, Consoli-
dation in Hong Kong: The Shui On Case, 3 ARB. INT'L 87, 88 (1987).
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(1) Where in relation to two or more arbitration proceedings it ap-
pears to the court;
(a) that some common question of law or fact arises in both
or all of them; or
(b) that the rights to relief claimed therein are in respect of
or arise out of the same transaction or series of transactions;
or
(c) that for some other reason it is desirable to make an or-
der under this section, the court may order those arbitration
proceedings to be consolidated on such terms as it thinks just
or may order them to be heard at the same time, or in one
immediately after another, or may order any of them to be
stayed until after the determination of any other of them.14 1
To date, the Hong Kong Ordinance has only been applied in domestic
arbitrations. 4 2 Whether the courts in Hong Kong would apply the com-
pulsory consolidation statute to international arbitrations taking place in
that jurisdiction is uncertain. However, recent trends indicate that Hong
Kong would not use the compulsory consolidation provision in interna-
tional arbitrations.' 43 Because the application of the Hong Kong com-
pulsory consolidation provision is uncertain in the context of
international arbitrations, the international practitioner should take steps
to include a contractual opt out provision in the arbitration clause to
prevent any surprises.
B. Consolidation Under English Law
In contrast to the previously mentioned jurisdictions, English courts
have not found authority to order consolidation absent the express con-
sent of the parties. The propriety of consolidation was considered at
length by the English Commercial Court's Arbitration Sub-Committee in
1985. Although the Committee recognized strong support for a compul-
141 Id. at 88.
142 For a discussion of the two domestic cases which have involved consolidation in Hong
Kong, see Veeder, Consolidation: More News from the Front-Line, 3 ARB. INT'L 262 (1987).
143 Id. at 265-66.
rIhe Law Reform Commission's recent Report on the Uncitral Model Law has advised
against including in Hong Kong's enactment of the Model Law any compulsory consolida-
tion procedure. This advice is stated to have been influenced by five considerations: first,
the unattractive element of court control into the arbitration process created by such a
compulsory procedure; second, the difficulties in devising a workable procedure 'in the
international context' as opposed to the domestic context; third, the risk that parties might
not select Hong Kong as a venue if the compulsory procedure were mis-understood to
mean that the Hong Kong Courts interfered with international arbitrations; fourth, the
violation of the compulsory procedure of the secrecy of the arbitral process chosen by the
parties; and fifth, 'it has been suggested in some jurisdictions that [Article V(I)(d) of the
New York Convention] may make an award made in a consolidated arbitration unenforce-
able in other New York Convention countries.'
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sory consolidation statute, it found two obstacles which could not be
overcome. Specifically, the Committee found that:
(a) any imposition of a unified dispute-settling mechanism will invari-
ably mean a breach of contractual rights of at least one of the parties;
(b) an award which embodies the decision of the tribunal insofar as it
falls outside the scope of the arbitration agreement is likely to encoun-
ter serious difficulties when it comes to enforcement under the New
York Convention 44
As a result of the Sub-Committee's report, consolidation is only permissi-
ble in England when specifically agreed to by the parties.
Although sympathetic to the need for consolidation, the English
courts have been unwilling to order consolidated arbitrations in the ab-
sence of contractual or statutory authority.14 The English courts' posi-
tion was clearly articulated in Oxford Shipping, where the court stated
that:
The concept of private arbitrations derives simply from the fact that
the parties have agreed to submit to arbitration particular disputes
arising between them and only between them. It is implicit in this that
strangers shall be excluded from the hearing and conduct of the arbi-
tration and that neither the tribunal nor any of the parties can insist
that the dispute shall be heard or determined concurrently with or
even in consonance with another dispute, however convenient that
course may be to the party seeking it and however closely associated
with each other the disputes in question may be. 146
This would seem to be a reasonable analysis. Clearly, in opting to avoid
the litigation process by contracting for arbitration, parties often contem-
plate confidentiality in the context of the arbitral procedure.
For these reasons and the reasons stated in the Sub-Committee re-
port, the basic position of the English courts has been that compulsory
consolidation constitutes an impermissible intrusion into the parties'
agreements and therefore should not be ordered. 4 7
VII. CONSOLIDATED ARBITRATIONS AND ENFORCEMENT OF
AWARDS UNDER THE NEW YORK CONVENTION
The recognition and enforcement of foreign arbitral awards is essen-
144 Working Paper of I February 1985 at 2, 14, 15 (prepared under the chairmanship of Sir
Michael Mustill).
145 See Oxford Shipping Co. v. Nippon Yusen Kaisha, 2 Lloyd's Rep. 373, 379 (1984); In-
terbulk Ltd. v. Aiden Shipping Co. Ltd., 2 Lloyds Rep. 66, 75 (1984); Abu Dhabi Gas Liquefaction
Co. Ltd. v. Eastern Bechtel Corp., 2 Lloyd's Rep. 425, 427 (1982).
146 Oxford Shipping Co., 2 Lloyd's Rep. at 379.
147 For a more in depth discussion of English case law and the problem of multiparty disputes
see Veeder, Multi-Party Disputes: Consolidation Under English Law, "The Vimeira" - a Sad Forensic
Fable, 2 ARB. INT'L 310 (1986).
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tial to the use of arbitration as a mechanism for dispute resolution in the
context of international commercial transactions. Arbitration would be
an unacceptable method of dispute resolution if the enforceability of
awards was uncertain or determined on an ad hoc basis. Clearly, it
would not make sense for a party to enter into an arbitration agreement if
the arbitration award would not have a binding effect. Consequently, the
success of international arbitration is largely dependent on the enforce-
ability of the resulting award. 4 ' To this end the United States, in addi-
tion to approximately seventy-six other nations and jurisdictions, has
adopted the United Nations Convention on the Recognition and En-
forcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards ("New York Convention"). 49
The introduction of compulsory consolidation into an international
arbitration proceeding creates an element of uncertainty with respect to
the recognition and enforcement of foreign arbitral awards. Specifically,
it is uncertain whether an award arising out of compulsory consolidation
is enforceable under the terms of the New York Convention. 150 If such
an award is not enforceable, compulsory consolidation would become a
destabilizing feature in the realm of international arbitration, thus frus-
trating the goals of the arbitral process itself.
Enforcement of an award arising out of a compulsory consolidation
proceeding has not been sought in the United States or abroad to date.
Due to the dearth of case law in this area, this discussion centers on the
language of the Convention and the construction it has been given by the
contracting states where the enforcement of bilateral awards has been
sought.
An examination of the New York Convention reveals two provi-
sions which may provide barriers to the recognition and enforcement of
foreign arbitral awards. Specifically, jurisdictions not favoring compul-
sory consolidation could deny enforcement of such awards under articles
V(1)(d) or V(2)(b). While the majority of the commentary in this area
has focused almost exclusively on article V(1)(d), consideration of the
latter provision is equally important.
Article V(1)(d) of the New York Convention provides that:
148 See Aksen, American Arbitration Accession Arrives in the Age of Aquarius: United States
Implements United Nations Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral
Awards, 3 Sw. U.L. REv. 1, 26 n.99 (1971)[hereinafter Aksen II]. "International arbitration '...
provides a sort of 'Esperanto' language of law that only needs standardized enforcement measures to
make it both acceptable and understandable to businessmen, no matter to what system of national
law they are accustomed."' Id. (quoting Peck, N.Y.LJ. Mar. 17, 1967, at 1, col. 3).
149 Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, June 10,
1958, 21 U.S.T. 2517, T.LA.S. No. 6997, 330 U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter New York Convention].
150 See van den Berg, Consolidated Arbitrations and the 1958 New York Arbitration Convention,
2 ARB. INT'L 367 (1986) [hereinafter van den Berg, 1958 Convention]; Critique of Dr. van den Berg,
supra note 138, at 42.
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1. Recognition and enforcement of the award may be refused, at the
request of the party against whom it is invoked, only if that party fur-
nishes to the competent authority where the recognition and enforce-
ment is sought, proof that:
(d) The composition of the arbitral authority or the arbitral procedure
was not in accordance with the agreement of the parties, or, failing
such agreement, was not in accordance with the law of the country
where the arbitration took place[.]...
The effect of article V(1)(d) is clear and unambiguous. Where the
composition of the arbitral panel or the procedure governing the pro-
ceedings is not in conformity with the parties' agreement, a State may
refuse enforcement of the resulting award. As previously noted, compul-
sory consolidation necessarily rewrites the parties' contracts. If a panel
selection clause is provided in the arbitration clause, it is necessarily re-
written when compulsory consolidation is effected. Thus, neither the
composition of the arbitral panel nor the procedure governing the pro-
ceeding is in accordance with the parties' agreements.
Arguing that article V(1)(d) will not prevent enforcement of a con-
solidated award, proponents of compulsory consolidation maintain that,
"When parties agree to arbitrate in a given jurisdiction, the agreement
implies that they also agree on the applicability of the arbitration law of
that jurisdiction. If the arbitration law includes the possibility of judi-
cially ordered consolidation of related arbitrations, that possibility forms
part of their agreement."1 2 While this argument appears to be persua-
sive at first glance, a closer examination reveals a serious flaw in its rea-
soning. Specifically, this argument presupposes that the choice of law
provision and the forum selection provision contained in an arbitration
agreement are one and the same. However, this is clearly not the case.
The choice of law and forum selection provisions are separate and dis-
tinct and represent independently negotiated clauses.153 This fact is clear
from the language of article V(1)(d) itself, which provides that the law of
the country where the arbitration took place is only to be looked to in the
absence of an agreement by the parties. Where the agreement of the par-
ties provides for the composition of the arbitral tribunal, the enforcing
state is not free to disregard that agreement. Rather, the enforcing state
may only look to the law of the forum when the parties are silent with
respect to the composition of the arbitral tribunal.
Proponents of compulsory consolidation attempt to obfuscate the
meaning of article V(1)(d) by disregarding the actual language of the lim-
itation and focusing their attention on the construction it should be
151 New York Convention, supra note 149, art. V(1)(d).
152 van den Berg, 1958 Convention, supra note 150, at 368.
153 Coulson, supra note 14, at 359.
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given. 154 This appears to be an oxymoron, as the construction of the
provision must necessarily start with its language. However, even if the
provision is given a liberal reading, it is difficult to imagine how one
could advance against the explicit language contained in the article itself.
The next potential obstacle to the enforcement of an award under
the New York Convention is article V(2)(b). It provides that:
(2) Recognition and enforcement of an arbitral award may also
be refused if the competent authority in the country where recognition
and enforcement is sought finds that:
(b) The recognition or enfordement of the award would be
contrary to the public policy of that country.
155
Under this provision, countries that perceive court ordered consolidation
as an infringement on the contractual rights of the parties may refuse to
enforce the award on the ground that public policy is to give effect to
freedom of contract.
Addressing the public policy provision, one commentator has noted
that:
[Tihere really is no practical limit to the type[s] of situations which
each country would include within its own public policy. Certainly the
phrase "public policy" will provide considerable latitude for the inge-
nuity of defense counsel, and it is quite likely that a variety of interp re-
tations will be forthcoming from the courts of different countries.1
6
The construction of the public policy provision will necessarily vary from
one jurisdiction to the next,157 but it should not be a surprise if some
jurisdictions find that rewriting the parties' contracts is violative of pub-
lic policy.
In view of the potential obstacles to the enforcement of awards
under the New York Convention, a logical question is whether consoli-
dation should be compelled if the award cannot be recognized in the con-
cerned jurisdiction. Although federal courts in the United States have
answered this question affirmatively in dealing with other issues,'58 it
154 See van den Berg, Consolidated Arbitrations, the New York Arbitration Convention and the
Dutch Arbitration Act 1986 - A Replique to Mr. Jarvin, 3 ARB. INT'L 257 (1987).
155 New York Convention, supra note 149, art. V(2)(b).
156 Aksen II, supra note 148, at 13.
157 The public policy limitation in the New York Convention is narrowly construed in the
United States to refuse recognition only when enforcement of the award would violate basic notions
of "morality and justice." See Fotochrome, Inc. v. Cope Co., Ltd., 517 F.2d 512 (2d Cir. 1975).
This construction is not required by the New York Convention, nor is it necessarily shared by con-
tracting states. Clearly, contracting states that have refused to order compulsory consolidation may
find the intrusion on the parties' contractual rights contrary to the public policy favoring freedom of
contracL
158 See Becker Autoradio v. Becker Autoradiowerk GmbH, 585 F.2d 39 (3d Cir. 1978); Rhone
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would seem senseless to employ a procedural device which would deny
any effect to the resulting award.
In the final analysis, one commentator has stated that:
The shortcomings of consolidation where enforcement is sought
abroad increase the risk of additional litigation, run counter to the
goals of easing and smoothing the enforcement and recognition process
of arbitral awards which inspire the New York Convention, and, in the
long run, break down ... confidene ... in international commercial
arbitration. 159
VIII. CONCLUSION
While multiparty disputes continue to present difficulties for the in-
ternational practitioner, the solution does not lie in compulsory consoli-
dation. Such a device runs counter to the fundamental goals of the
arbitral process, which seeks to limit judicial intervention and establish a
self-governing mechanism for dispute resolution.
Multiparty disputes are a fairly common feature of construction
contracts and maritime charter party agreements. 160 As a result, mul-
tiparty disputes should be anticipated and provided for in the respective
arbitration clauses. Parties to such agreements should be required to de-
cide in advance whether or not arbitrations should be consolidated in the
event of a multiparty dispute. Allowing a party who has contracted for
one method of arbitration to petition the court for an alternative method
when they later determine that the method they have agreed upon no
longer serves their particular interests undermines the fundamental con-
cept that the arbitration clause is voluntarily entered into by a contrac-
tual allocation of risk.
A more acceptable method of guarding against the problems of mul-
tiparty disputes would be for the parties to include or exclude consolida-
tion in the arbitration clause at the time of contracting. Such an
agreement could be made in the primary contract and incorporated by
reference in the various subcontracts.
Another alternative to compulsory consolidation would be for the
major arbitral institutions to include provisions in their rules providing
for consolidation in the event of a multiparty dispute. 161 However, in
keeping with the fundamental principle of freedom of contract, such pro-
Mediterranee Compagnia Francese di Assicurazioni e Riassicurazioni v. Lauro, 555 F. Supp. 481
(D. St. Thomas and St. John 1982), aff'd, 712 F.2d 50 (3d Cir. 1983).
159 Hascher, supra note 10, at 138.
160 INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION, supra note 8, at 74.
161 In this respect, both foreign and domestic statutes providing for consolidation could be
used where the parties explicitly provide for the law of that state to govern the resolution of disputes,
and the statute provides for an opt out provision in the arbitration clause.
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visions would have to include an opportunity for the parties to opt out of
the rule at the time of contracting. The opt out requirement, rather than
an opt in requirement, would not place an onerous burden on any of the
parties or pose any surprises at the time of the dispute. All parties who
bargain at arms length are assumed to have read and understood the
rules that are incorporated into a contract which they have signed. Thus,
if the institutional rules contain a consolidation provision and if the par-
ties do not specifically contract out of the provision, the courts may order
consolidation in the event of a multiparty dispute.
The foreseeability of multiparty disputes in construction contracts
and maritime charter party agreements affords the parties an opportunity
to avoid unnecessary complications and makes court ordered consolida-
tion unnecessary. An arbitration agreement represents a contractual al-
location of risk for which both parties have bargained and should not be
disturbed merely because one party is dissatisfied with the bargain he or
she has struck. The need for uniform recognition and enforcement of
awards and the sanctity of the parties' contract outweigh the minimal
benefits that court ordered consolidation confers.
In the final analysis, if consolidation is to be effected in accordance
with the underlying principles of the arbitral process, it must be volunta-
rily entered into by the parties at the time of contracting. Where the
parties intend to contract for consolidated proceedings in the event of a
multiparty dispute practitioners should take care to provide for contin-
gencies such as alternate panel selection methods, alternate choice of law,
and alternate choice of procedure. In addition, parties should consider
limiting how far down the chain of privity they wish to have disputes
consolidated and set clear and unambiguous limits on how far removed a
party may be from the original contract to be eligible to participate in a
consolidated proceeding. In this manner the basic characteristics of self
governance and predictability can be preserved to the greatest extent pos-
sible.
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